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SURVEY SECTION
Civil Procedure. Catanzaro v. Central Congregational Church,
723 A.2d 774 (R.I. 1999). Prejudgment interest continues to accrue
on a judgment during the pendency of the judgment-creditor's ap-
peal when the judgment-debtor makes a conditional offer of pay-
ment. The Rhode Island Supreme Court's previous decision in
Paola v. Commercial Union Assurance Co. (Paolo II), holding that
a judgement-creditor should not benefit from an award of post-
judgment interest where the delay in payment is due to the judg-
ment-creditor's unsucessful appeal, does not apply where a judg-
ment-debtor only makes a conditional offer of payment.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On August 16, 1991, William Catanzaro (Catanzaro), while
employed by Eastern Construction Company, was injured during
renovations of the Central Congregational Church.2 Catanzaro
filed a personal injury action against Central Congregational
Church (Central), claiming that Central negligently maintained
the premises in a hazardous condition.3 The jury returned a ver-
dict for Catanzaro in the amount of $400,000, finding that Catan-
zaro was fifty percent comparatively negligent.4
Catanzaro moved for reapportionment of liablity, or for a new
trial on the issue of liability.5 The trial justice denied the motion,
and Catanzaro filed his first appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, alleging that the trial justice failed to perform an individual
evaluation of the evidence. 6 In a per curiam decision, the supreme
court denied Catanzaro's appeal and affirmed the decision of the
trial justice, finding that the record contained sufficient evidence
for the jury to conclude Catanzaro was partially at fault.7
On remand, Catanzaro requested execution of the judgment,
plus statutory interest from the time of the injury until the court's
per curiam decision.8 Adhering to the holding of Paola II, a supe-
1. 490 A.2d 498, 499 (R.I. 1985).
2. See Cantanzaro v. Central Congregational Church, 705 A.2d 533, 534 (R.I.
1998).
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 535.
8. See Catanzaro v. Central Congregational Church, 723 A.2d 774, 775 (R.I.
1999).
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rior court justice agreed with Central's argument that Catanzaro
was not entitled to collect interest on the judgment during the pen-
dency of his unsuccessful appeal.9 Accordingly, the trial justice
held that the judgment ceased to earn interest on the date that
Catanzaro filed his notice of appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court. 10 Thereafter, Catanzaro filed the instant appeal to the
court, claiming that Rhode Island General Laws section 9-21-10
entitled him to statutory interest on the judgment, running from
the date of the injury until the date of the denial of Catanzaro's
appeal."
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court framed the central issue in
this case as whether a judgment creditor has a right to prejudg-
ment interest accrued pending their own unsuccessful appeal. 12
Turning to its decision in Paola II, the court reiterated the policy
justifying denial of interest during pendency of an appeal. 13 The
court stated, "a judgment creditor who undertakes an unsuccessful
appeal should not be allowed to collect interest during pendency of
the appeal [because it is] the creditor's own act [that renders the]
collection of the judgment impossible."' 4 The rule applies equally
to those seeking prejudgment or postjudgment interest, because
the purpose of the rule is to discourage creditors from inflating
their awards by filing frivolous appeals. 15
The court then held that the facts of the instant case distin-
guished it from Paola H.16 Prior to Catanzaro's unsuccessful ap-
peal, Central sent Catanzaro a letter offering to satisfy the
judgment, but refused to pay interest accrued on the judgment un-
til the resolution of Catanzaro's appeal.' 7 Although Central ar-
gued that this letter constituted an unconditional offer of payment,
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id. See also R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-21-10(a) (1956) (1997 Reenactment)
(providing that in civil actions in which pecuniary damages are awarded, interest
at a rate of twelve percent should be added "from the date the cause of action
accrued").
12. See Catanzaro, 723 A.2d at 776.
13. See id.
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 776-77.
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the supreme court disagreed. 18 The court concluded that Central's
offer of payment was conditioned on Catanzaro's agreement to
forego an appeal. 19 Since Central's offer of payment was not un-
conditional, it was not Catanzaro's act that made collection of the
judgment impossible, but rather the conditions imposed by Cen-
tral.20 In closing, the court pointed out that an unconditional offer
of payment would have triggered the application of Paola II and
prevented the accrual of prejudgment interest.21 However, be-
cause Central's offer of payment was conditional, Catanzaro was
entitled to collect prejudgment interest on the judgment up until
the date of the disposition of the present appeal.22
CONCLUSION
Where a judgement-creditor brings an ultimately unsuccessful
appeal, the Paola II rule prevents the creditor from collecting in-
terest on the judgment only if the judgment-debtor makes an un-
conditional offer of payment. Where the offer of payment is
conditional, it is the action of the judgment-debtor, and not the
judgment-creditor, that delays collection of the judgment.
John B. Garry
18. See id. at 777.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
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Civil Procedure. Hall v. Insurance Co. of North America, 727
A.2d 667 (R.I. 1999). Whether or not a plaintiff has exercised due
diligence in discovering the identity of an unknown defendant may
be decided by a trial justice, rather than a jury, where the facts
suggest only one reasonable inference.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In Hall v. Insurance Co. of North America,' police officer
Charles E. Hall (Hall) was injured when he fell in a stairwell at the
East Providence police station on November 6, 1984.2 Hall filed a
civil action for negligence against DeStefano Building Co. and a
John Doe corporation on October 16, 1987. 3 Hall amended his
complaint on May 9, 1989, by adding Insurance Company of North
America in place of the designated John Doe defendant.4 Three
years and nine months later, Hall amended his complaint for a sec-
ond time to include Robinson Green Berretta Corporation (RGB) as
a defendant. 5 At the time of the second amended complaint, the
statute of limitations had run on Hall's claim.
Thereafter, RGB motioned for summary judgment, which was
granted by the superior court on the grounds that Hall's failure to
retain a "John Doe" defendant in his first amended complaint pre-
cluded him from naming RGB in his most recent complaint. 6 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court reversed this decision in Hall v. In-
surance Co. of North America,7 finding that Hall's failure to in-
clude a "John Doe" defendant "did not completely cut off" Hall's
joining of RGB.8 Because the question of whether due diligence
had been exercised by Hall in joining RGB as a defendant was not
determined by the superior court, the supreme court remanded for
a determination of that issue.9
1. 727 A.2d 667 (R.I. 1999) [hereinafter Hall II].
2. See id. at 668.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. 666 A.2d 805 (R.I. 1995) [hereinafter Hall I].
8. Id. at 806.
9. See id.
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On remand, the superior court found that Hall had not exer-
cised due diligence and summary judgment was granted in favor of
RGB.10 Hall appealed."
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
In his second appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, Hall
argued that the question of whether due diligence had been exer-
cised was a question of material fact that could not be decided in a
summary judgment proceeding because it must be determined by a
jury.12 The supreme court rejected this argument, stating that
Hall misconstrued its order in Hall I as well as subsequent case
law on the subject.13
In Hall I, the supreme court believed there was only one rea-
sonable inference to be drawn concerning whether due diligence
had been exercised by the plaintiff.14 Therefore, the court ex-
pressly ordered that the trial justice determine this factual issue
as a preliminary question before ruling on the motion for summary
judgment. 15 When only one reasonable inference can be drawn
from the facts concerning whether or not due diligence has been
exercised, the issue may become a matter of law. 16 Under those
circumstances, the superior court should resolve this factual ques-
tion as a preliminary issue before determining whether the statute
of limitations has run prior to the addition of the defendant.' 7 It is
only where the facts surrounding plaintiffs exercise of due dili-
gence are susceptible to more than one determination that the is-
sue must be determined by a jury.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court next turned to the issue of
whether the addition of RGB in Hall's second amended complaint
should relate back under Rule 15 of the Superior Court Rules of
10. See Hall 1I, 727 A.2d at 668.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. See also Grossi v. Miriam Hospital, 689 A.2d 403 (R.I. 1997) (hold-
ing that summary judgment could not be entered as a matter of law where the
facts permitted more than one reasonable inference regarding whether plaintiff
acted with due diligence in identifying and locating the defendant).
14. See Hall 1, 666 A.2d at 806.
15. See id.
16. See Hall 1I, 727 A.2d at 668.
17. See id.
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Civil Procedure.' 8 Rule 15 permits an amendment to relate back
only where there has been an error made concerning the identity of
the proper party and where that party would be chargeable with
the knowledge of that mistake. 19 The rule was not intended to
"4'permit relation back where ... there is a lack of knowledge of the
proper party.'"20
Applying these principles, the supreme court announced a
two-step process that may be employed by the hearing justice.
First, the hearing justice may determine whether plaintiff exer-
cised due diligence in ascertaining the identity of an unknown de-
fendant.21 This is a factual determination to be made before any
final ruling on the motion for summary judgment.22 Second, if the
hearing justice finds that the plaintiff has not exercised due dili-
gence, the trial justice may deny relation back of the amended com-
plaint and grant summary judgment as a matter of law in favor of
the newly named defendant. 23 If, however, the hearing justice
finds that the facts suggest due diligence has been exercised in dis-
covering the identity of the previously unknown defendant, the jus-
tice must then determine two other factors before allowing the
relation back to the filing date of the original complaint. 24
These two factors are set out in Rules 15 and 4 of the Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure. 25 The first factor is whether within
120 days after the commencement of the plaintiffs action, the ad-
ded party received such notice of the filing of the action so as not to
be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits.26 The sec-
ond factor is whether within the 120-day period, the party knew or
should have known that, but for the plaintiffs mistake concerning
his or her identity, he or she would have been named a party in the
original complaint. 27
18. See id. at 669.
19. See id.; R.I. Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 15.
20. Hall H, 727 A.2d at 669 (quoting Wilson v. United States Government, 23
F.3d 559, 563 (1st Cir. 1994)).
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 670.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
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Noting that the superior court found Hall did not pursue the
identity of RGB with due diligence, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that the trial justice properly entered summary judg-
ment in favor of RGB. 28 Therefore, it was not necessary for the
superior court to consider whether Hall's second amended com-
plaint should relate back under Rule 15 of the Superior Court
Rules of Civil Procedure.
CONCLUSION
In Hall v. Insurance Co. of North America, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court affirmed the superior court decision to grant RGB
summary judgment. In so doing, the court held that a trial justice
may decide, as a preliminary factual issue in a motion for sum-
mary judgment, whether a plaintiff exercised due diligence in de-
termining the identity of an unknown defendant where the facts
support only one reasonable inference.
Sheila M. Lombardi
28. See id.
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Civil Procedure. Jackson v. Medical Coaches, 734 A.2d 502 (R.I.
1999). Rule 60(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure
does not provide relief for judgments based on an error of law. A
motion to dismiss for untimely service of process is governed by
Rule 4(l) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure rather
than the more general Rule 41(b)(2).
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In Jackson v. Medical Coaches,' the plaintiff, Patricia V. Jack-
son (Jackson), injured herself while trying to retrieve a stretcher
from a mobile-medical trailer, when a hand crank hit her head as
she was attempting to open a roll-up door.2 She filed a complaint
against defendants Medical Coaches and Siemans Medical Sys-
tems, Inc. (Siemans).3 Both Medical Coaches and Siemans filed
motions pursuant to Rules 12(b)(5) and 41(b)(2) of the Superior
Court Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss Jackson's claims, alleg-
ing that they had not been served with process until over four
months after she had filed her complaint. 4 The superior court jus-
tice held a hearing on the defendants' motions and dismissed Jack-
son's complaint with prejudice.5 Final judgments were entered as
to both defendants pursuant to Rule 54(b).6
Jackson did not appeal from either judgment, but filed a sec-
ond action against the two defendants which was identical to her
first complaint.7 The defendants moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that the statute of limitations and res judicata barred
her claims." These motions were granted by the court but the en-
try of judgment was stayed for thirty days in order to allow Jack-
son to file a motion to vacate the judgment on her first complaint.9
Jackson filed the motion to vacate almost three months later and
mistakenly filed the motion in the second action rather than the
first case, but because she had filed a memorandum of law in sup-
port of her motion within the thirty days, the superior court heard
1. 734 A.2d 502 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id. at 503.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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the motion.' 0 The superior court granted the motion and an order
was entered stating that the first complaint was dismissed without
prejudice." The defendants appealed. 12
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Defendants argued that Jackson should not have filed a mo-
tion to vacate pursuant to Rule 60(b) because the error in this case,
the trial justice's error in dismissing the case with prejudice, is not
the type of "mistake" contemplated by Rule 60(b).13 The supreme
court agreed with this argument, noting that "Rule 60(b)(1) per-
mits relief from the operation of a judgment due to mistake, inad-
vertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. . . [and] Rule 60(b)(6)
provides relief from judgment for 'any other reason justifying re-
lief.'"'14 The court pointed out, however, that Rule 60(b) is not a
"catchall,"15 relief is justified only under extraordinary circum-
stances, 16 and that neither 60(b)(1) nor 60(b)(6) were available to
Jackson.17
Jackson argued at the hearing on her motion to vacate that
Rule 4(l) and Rule 41(b)(2) were in conflict with each other.18 She
claimed that her situation was governed by Rule 4(l) and therefore
her dismissal should have been without prejudice. 19 However, the
court stated that post-trial discovery of applicable law that was not
perceived or raised at trial does not provide grounds for relief
under Rule 60(b).20 The court held that Jackson's motion to vacate
on the grounds that the superior court mistakenly ordered the
judgment with prejudice should not have been granted.21
10. See id.
11. See id. at 503-04.
12. See id. at 504.
13. See id. at 505; Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
14. Jackson, 734 A.2d at 505 (quoting Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6)).
15. Id. (quoting Bendix Corp. v. Norberg, 404 A.2d 505, 506 (R.I. 1979)).
16. See id. (citing Bendix Corp., 404 A.2d at 506 (quoting 1 Kent, Rhode Island
Practice: Rules of Civil Procedure with Commentaries § 60.08 at 456 (1969))).
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id. See also Super. Ct. R. Civ. P. 4(l) (stating that if a defendant is not
served within 120 days after the complaint is filed, the action shall be dismissed
without prejudice).
20. See Jackson, 734 A.2d at 505 (citing Bendix Corp., 404 A.2d at 507).
21. See id.
20001 619
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The motion justice ruled that he was vacating the original
judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), which provides that a judg-
ment that is void can be vacated. 22 He believed that he had erred
in ordering the dismissal with prejudice because Rule 4() ap-
plied.23 The motion justice reasoned that since Rule 4(l) specified
that the dismissal should be without prejudice, his contrary order
must be void.24 Siemans argued that the order was not void, and
the supreme court agreed, noting that a judgment is not void
merely by virtue of being erroneous. 25
The defendants also argued that the superior court properly
dismissed Jackson's complaint with prejudice under Rule 41(b)(2)
because Jackson's delay in serving of process was unreasonable
and unjustified. 26 The supreme court disagreed with this conten-
tion, however, and concluded that Jackson was correct in her argu-
ment that Rule 4(l), dealing with untimely service of process, was
controlling rather than Rule 41(b)(2), which deals generally with
failure to comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure or with an order
of the court, or lack of prosecution. 27 The supreme court con-
cluded, therefore, that it was error for the motion justice to dismiss
with prejudice under Rule 41(b)(2) rather than without prejudice
under Rule 4().28 However, the supreme court concluded that the
proper remedy for this error would have been a motion to amend
the judgments under Rule 52(b) or Rule 59(e) within ten days of
the entry of the judgments, and Jackson's failure to do so did not
make Rule 60(b) relief available to her.2 9
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that dismissal of
a claim for untimely service of process is governed by Rule 4() of
the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure rather than by the
more general Rule 42(b)(2). The court concluded that a legal mis-
22. See id. at 506.
23. See id.
24. The justice stated, "It seems to me if the Rule says dismissed without prej-
udice, my Order was void. It doesn't make any sense." Id.
25. See id. (citing 11 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Proce-
dure § 2862 (2d ed. 1995).
26. See id.
27. See id. at 506-07.
28. See id. at 507.
29. See id.
20001 SURVEY SECTION 621
take does not render a judgment void, nor does it constitute
grounds to vacate a judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) or Rule
60(b)(6). The proper means to obtain relief from a judgment based
on a legal mistake is by appeal.
Jennifer K. Towle
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Civil Procedure. Millman v. Millman, 732 A.2d 1118 (R.I. 1999).
Pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate
Procedure, a trial court may extend the time period in which a
party may file an appeal for an additional thirty days beyond the
intial twenty day period. Because the thirty day extension must
begin to run at the expiration of the initial twenty day period, not
from the date that the extension was granted, the court must grant
the motion for an extension within fifty days of the judgment or
decree which is the subject of the appeal, and the appellant must
file the notice of appeal within the same fifty day period.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiff, Carole A. Millman (Carole), and defendant, Har-
vey Millman (Harvey), were married on September 30, 1956.1 Car-
ole filed for divorce on June 29, 1994.2 The family court rendered a
final decision in the Millman's divorce proceeding on May 9, 1997. 3
At or around this time, Harvey's attorney was suffering from an
illness. 4 Therefore, on June 1, 1997, Harvey's attorney filed a mo-
tion to extend the time to appeal the proper division of marital as-
sets.5 A hearing on the motion occurred on June 30, 1997, and on
July 2, 1997, the family court entered an order granting Harvey
until August 1, 1997, to file his notice of appeal. 6 On July 22, 1997,
Carole filed a notice of appeal from the family court's order grant-
ing Harvey an extension of time.7 Harvey filed his appeal of the
proper division of marital assets on July 29, 1997.8
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court denied Harvey's appeal af-
ter concluding that it was filed more than fifty days after the final
decision was rendered. 9 Rule 4(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of
Appellate Procedure provides that an appeal "shall be filed with
the clerk of the trial court within twenty (20) days of the date of
1. See Millman v. Millman, 723 A.2d 1118, 1119 (R.I. 1999).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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entry of the judgment, order or decree appealed from . . ."1o and
allows for a thirty day extension of time to appeal, upon a showing
of neglect, before or after the twenty day period has expired. 1 The
court has previously ruled that the time specified in Rule 4(a) is
mandatory. 12 Furthermore, the court has also held that the thirty
day extension "begins running at the expiration of the original
twenty-day period, and not from the date the motion to extend is
granted."13 Therefore, an appeal cannot be filed more than fifty
days after the judgment is rendered.
In Millman, the final decision was executed on May 9, 1997.
As a result, an extension could only be granted to a date of June
30, 1997, fifty days after the date of entry of final judgment.' 4
However, the trial court entered the order granting the extension
on July 2, 1997, and Harvey filed his notice of appeal on July 29,
1997.1r Neither the court's order nor Harvey's appeal fell within
the fifty day period following the entry of judgment.16 Therefore,
the court concluded that Harvey's notice of appeal was untimely
and vacated the trial court's order extending the time to appeal.' 7
CONCLUSION
The time specified in Rule 4(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of
Appellate Procedure is mandatory. The trial court may not grant
an extension of time in which to file an appeal more than fifty days
after the final judgment, decree, or order is entered. In the event
that an extension is granted, the appellant may not file notice of
appeal beyond the same fifty day period.
Melissa Coulombe Beauchesne
10. R.I. Sup. Ct. R. App. P. 4(a) (emphasis added).
11. See id.
12. See Millman, 723 A.2d at 1119 (citing Warwick Land Trust, Inc. v. Chil-
dren's Friend and Serv., Inc, 604 A.2d 1266, 1267 (R.I. 1992)).
13. Id. (citing Mitchell v. Mitchell, 522 A.2d 219, 220 (R.I. 1987)).
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
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Civil Procedure. State v. Presler, 731 A.2d 699 (R.I. 1999). In a
prosecution for driving under the influence, death resulting and
driving as to endanger, death resulting, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court determined that res judicata principles, not law-of-the-case
doctrine, applied to the court's prior ruling on an interlocutory ap-
peal concerning the defendant's motion to suppress.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In State v. Presler,' the defendant was charged with driving
under the influence, death resulting2 and driving so as to endan-
ger, death resulting,3 as a result of a motor vehicle accident that
occurred on March 13, 1994.4 On the date of the accident, a Rhode
Island state police trooper observed the defendant traveling north-
bound in the southbound lane of Interstate Route 95.5 The trooper
attempted unsuccessfully to gain the attention of defendant.6 De-
fendant then drove onto an exit ramp and headed eastbound on
Route 195 West.7 It is on that stretch of highway that defendant
collided with another vehicle driven by Joseph Abilheira, who died
because of his injuries from the accident." The defendant, uncon-
scious after the accident, was taken to Rhode Island Hospital. 9
While being treated for his injuries at the hospital, the emer-
gency room nurse noticed the distinct smell of alcohol on defend-
ant.10 At that point, the hospital staff took a blood sample from
defendant to aid in his diagnosis and to determine if there was al-
cohol present in his bloodstream." While at the hospital, defend-
ant was also under the supervision of a state police trooper, who
responded to the scene of the accident and remained with defend-
ant during his time at the hospital. 12 The trooper questioned the
emergency room nurse about defendant's condition but was not
1. 731 A.2d 699 (R.I. 1999).
2. R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2.2 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
3. R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-1(a) (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
4. See Presler, 731 A.2d at 700.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 701.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
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present when the blood sample was taken from defendant. ' 3 The
blood tests disclosed defendant had a blood-alcohol level of 0. 198.14
Defendant was subsequently indicted on the two charges. 15
Before trial began, defendant filed a motion to suppress the
results of the blood alcohol tests taken at the hospital. 16 Defend-
ant's motion was granted by a superior court judge.' 7 The state
subsequently filed an interlocutory appeal with the Rhode Island
Supreme Court, and an order was entered on May 16, 1996 uphold-
ing the appropriateness of the hospital's blood tests and the admis-
sibility of the blood-alcohol tests.' 8 The case was then remanded
for trial.' 9
On remand, defendant filed a second motion to suppress the
admissibility of the blood-alcohol tests.20 Defendant's reasons for
bringing the second motion were identical to his initial motion to
suppress, but with the additional claim that his blood tests were
administered by an order of the state police.21 Defendant's second
motion to suppress was denied by a different superior court justice,
with a finding that defendant's blood was taken at the direction of
hospital staff and not by the state police. 22
At trial, defendant testified that he never consumed alcohol
and the party he attended on the night of the accident only served
non-alcoholic beverages. 23 Defendant claimed he had no recollec-
tion of the evening except for alleging he had been attacked by four
men.24 As a defense, defendant claimed that his drink was
poisoned "which then turned him into a 'zombie' and caused him to
lose his mind and.., involuntarily consume alcohol."25 Defendant
was convicted on both counts of driving under the influence of li-
quor or drugs, death resulting and driving as to endanger, death
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. Id. at 702.
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resulting.26 Subsequently, defendant filed an appeal claiming that
the trial judge was incorrect in denying his second motion to sup-
press the hospital blood tests.27
BACKGROUND
Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, applies to any
valid judgment that is final and decided on the merits. 28 Issue pre-
clusion, or collateral estoppel, compels the court to make the same
finding of fact on identical issues litigated in a previous suit involv-
ing the same litigants. 29 The law-of-the-case doctrine does not
have the degree of finality that pertains to claim and issue preclu-
sion.30 The law-of-the-case doctrine dictates that "when a court de-
cides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern
the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case."31 More-
over, the law-of-the-case doctrine does not completely bar reevalu-
ation of a previous decision in instances where new evidence is
produced that "significantly extends or expands the record."32
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The first issue on appeal was whether the denial of defend-
ant's second motion to suppress the results of his blood-alcohol test
was appropriate. 33 Defendant claims that blood samples taken
from him at the hospital were taken in violation of section 31-27-2
of the Rhode Island General Laws.34 The supreme court, however,
26. See id.
27. See id. The defendant also argued on appeal that the State erroneously
tried to refresh his recollection during cross-examination with the use of inadmis-
sible hearsay. The supreme court held that the only requisite for using an item to
refresh a witness' memory is that the witness must not remember a matter rele-
vant to the litigation, and noted that the item used to refresh recollection need not
be admissible in evidence. See id. at 704.
28. See id. at 705.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 703.
31. Id. at 705 (quoting Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486
U.S. 800, 815-16 (1988)).
32. Id. at 703 (quoting Richardson v. Smith, 691 A.2d 543, 546 (R.I. 1997)).
33. See id. at 702.
34. See id. R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2 states in pertinent part that "the test was
performed according to methods and with equipment approved by the director of
the department of health of the state of Rhode Island and by an authorized individ-
ual." R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-27-2 (1956) (1994 Reenactment).
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held that the samples were not taken in violation of the statute
and therefore were admissible at trial.35
The court also determined that the previous order filed on May
16, 1996 denying defendant's initial motion to suppress the blood
tests precluded defendant from revisiting the issue a second
time.36 In so deciding, the court reached its decision using the
principles of res judicata, not the law-of-the-case doctrine.37 Since
the .law-of-the-case doctrine does not have the finality of res judi-
cata and is seen as more a "nature of a rule of policy and conven-
ience,"38 the supreme court determined its May 16, 1996 ruling
had the effect of issue preclusion. 39 The court stated that the "May
16, 1996 order finally and conclusively determined that the defend-
ant's blood had not been taken in violation of section 31-27-2 and
would be admissible at his trial."40 That order effectively invoked
the principle of res judicata to the question of admissibility to de-
fendant's blood test results.41
The Rhode Island Supreme Court continued its discussion of
the law-of-the-case doctrine by distinguishing Richardson v.
Smith42 from the present case. The Richardson court articulated
that under the law-of-the-case doctrine, once a judge has decided
an interlocutory issue in a suit, a second judge on that same court
should not disturb the initial ruling on that matter if it is
presented at a later time in the suit.43 However, the court stated
that this case differs from Richardson because the interlocutory
matter was ruled upon by the Rhode Island Supreme Court as a
final determination and remanded back to the trial court for trial,
and was not decided on by another judge sitting on the same
court.
4 4
35. See Presler, 731 A.2d at 702.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 703 (quoting Salvadore v. Major Elec. & Supply, Inc., 469 A.2d 353,
356 (R.I. 1983)).
39. See id. at 702.
40. Id.
41. See id.
42. 691 A.2d 543 (R.I. 1997). Richardson is heavily relied upon by Justice
Flanders in his concurring opinion. He points out that the law-of-the-case doctrine
"will not bar reconsideration of an earlier order when evidence has been introduced
in the interim that significantly extends or expands the record." Id. at 546.
43. See id.
44. See Presler, 731 A.2d at 702-03.
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The court also indicated that the goal of finality caused the
court to apply the principles of res judicata instead of the law-of-
the-case doctrine.45 The court recognized that if defendant's sec-
ond motion to suppress contained new charges and new evidence,
it "might well have actually served to rescue his motion from the
non-final aspect of the law-of-the-case doctrine and permitted its
reconsideration by the second Superior Court trial justice."46
Nonetheless, that situation did not exist in the present case.47 De-
fendant provided no new evidence that would modify his initial
motion to suppress and therefore, the issue could not be read-
dressed under the application of res judicata principles.48
Concurring Opinion
Justice Flanders, while agreeing with the court's overall con-
clusion, disagreed with the manner in which the court made its
decision to affirm denial of defendant's second motion to sup-
press.49 Rather than using the principles of res judicata, Justice
Flanders determined that the issue of defendant's second motion to
suppress could be resolved by using the law-of-the-case doctrine.6 0
Justice Flanders noted that since the decision regarding the mo-
tion to suppress was interlocutory in nature, the law-of-the-case
doctrine, not res judicata, prevented the issue from being
revisited.51
CONCLUSION
In State v. Presler, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
the principles of res judicata and not the law-of-the-case doctrine
applied to interlocutory matters decided on an appellate level. The
court pointed to the finality aspect of res judicata as the reason for
its decision, but maintained that the law-of-the-case doctrine was
still good law when applied to identical interlocutory matters pre-
viously addressed and ruled on by a judge of the same court. Thus,
the supreme court clarified whether the doctrine of res judicata or
45. See id. at 703.
46. Id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 705.
50. See id.
51. See id.
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the law-of-the-case should be applied by a court when the court is
confronted with a previously decided issue.
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